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Abstract: This paper utilizes a unique three-wave panel of household data 
from Nicaragua, which allows a thorough exploration of the relationships 
between  migration,  remittances  and  household  consumption.  The  paper 
distinguishes  between  the  effects  of  emigration  and  the  impacts  of 
remittances received. There is a self-selection bias in the decision to send a 
migrant, as well as in the decision to receive remittances. To adequately 
correct for these selection biases, we develop a bivariate selection correction 
procedure. Perhaps  surprisingly,  the  results  show  that  households  do  not 
benefit (in terms of higher consumption growth) from receiving remittances, 
but rather from having migrants abroad. This suggests that not only money 
are remitted from abroad, but also something more subtle, which could be 
business ideas, belief systems, aspirations, patterns of social interaction, and 
other intangibles, which have been dubbed social remittances.     
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1. Introduction 
 
Nicaragua is a small nation of just 5.1 million people, but it is currently losing about 40.000 
persons annually to emigration (Bay, 2006). In return, it receives at least $500 million in 
remittances each year, corresponding to more than 10% of GDP
1. This implies that labor 
has become one of Nicaragua’s main export products (Baumeister, 2006). 
 
According to the 2005 Census, about 10.1% of all households have a migrant abroad, and 
about 8.1% receive remittances. Households with a migrant abroad are much more likely to 
receive remittances than those who do not have a migrant abroad (48.4% versus 3.6%). 
Figure 1 shows that it is mostly the relatively wealthy households that are able to send 
migrants abroad and thus also the relatively wealthy households that receive remittances. 
 
Figure 1: Share of households in Nicaragua who have migrants abroad  




























Have migrant abroad (%) Receive remittances (%)
 
                   Source: Authors’ calculation based on the 2005 Census.  
  
 
Previous  research  indicates  that  the  emigration  strategy  is  beneficial  for  the  sending 
household, as remittances received are sufficient to more than compensate for the loss of a 
                                                 
1 World Development Indicators, for the year 2004.   3 
working  member.  For  example,  Andersen,  Christensen  &  Molina  (2005)  show  that 
remittances tend to reduce the vulnerability of households and increase their upward social 
mobility, at least as long as the households do not depend too heavily on remittances. Cox 
&  Ureta  (2003)  found  that  remittances  are  very  important  for  school  retention  in  El 
Salvador, especially in urban areas, and especially compared to other sources of income. 
Similarly, Hanson & Woodruff (2003), using data from Mexico, find a positive relationship 
between child education and having a family member living abroad. They hypothesize that 
it is remittances that drive this result. Yang (2006), Lu & Treiman (2007) and Gonzales-
König & Wodon (2007) find similar results for the Phillipines, South Africa, and Congo, 
respectively. Woodruff & Zenteno (2001) estimate that remittances account for 20% of the 
capital invested in micro-enterprises throughout urban Mexico, and conclude that migration 
and  remittances  can  be  instrumental  in  overcoming  liquidity  constraints  to  the 
implementation of micro-enterprises. Arends-Kuenning et al (2005) show that remittances 
allow households to invest in better and healthier housing. Finally, Yang & Choi (2005) 
find that remittances work as an effective insurance mechanism.  
 
However, most previous studies do not adequately control for the selection bias that arises 
from the fact that not all households are able to use the migration-remittance strategy, as 
migration often requires a substantial initial investment. This implies that estimation results 
often present too rosy a picture of the effects of remittances.  One  notable exception  is 
Acosta (2006), who shows that robust estimates that take into account both selection bias 
and endogeneity problems in estimating an average impact of remittances are substantially 
different  from the  naïve  OLS  estimates presented  in previous  studies.  For example,  he 
shows that once selection bias is taken into account, remittances no longer have a positive 
effect on school attendance in El Salvador.  
 
One additional problem is that the emigration strategy may impose negative externalities on 
non-migrant  households  that  do  not  receive  remittances.  First,  the  large  inflow  of 
remittance dollars may create “Dutch Disease,” with the well-known effects of reduced 
competitiveness of local products compared to imports, and an increase in prices of non-
tradables (Acosta et al, 2007). Second, migrants are often either better educated or more   4 
dynamic and entrepreneurial than the average citizen, which means that they contributed 
disproportionately to job creation and tax revenues before they migrated. Such negative 
externalities inflate the apparent positive effects of remittances. 
 
Most previous analyses are limited to assessing the immediate static impacts, but not the 
subsequent  dynamic  effects  of  remittances.  A  household  that  receives  an  extra  $100 
immediately becomes wealthier, but what we are really interested in is whether this has a 
lasting impact, or quickly disappears in a consumption splurge. Some research has found 
that remittances account for a large share of the capital invested in micro-enterprises (e.g. 
Woodruff & Zenteno, 2001), suggestings that remittances might have a permanent positive 
effect on household consumption. Others find that remittances are detrimental to growth, 
likely because they induce a reduction in effort on part of the recipient (Chami, Fullenkamp 
& Jahjah, 2003). Thus, while the static effects of remittances are more or less obvious, 
there is still a big debate about the dynamic effects.  
 
In this paper we compare the static and dynamic impacts of both remittances and migration, 
taking into account selection biases in both the likelihood of having a migrant abroad and 
the  likelihood of receiving remittances.  We do this  by developing  a  bivariate selection 
correction procedure for the purpose. 
 
The  results  show  that  households  sending  migrants  do  experience  higher  consumption 
growth. However, the effect does not stem from the receipt of financial remittances, but 
simply from having one or more household members living abroad. These findings are 
consistent with the notion that more than just money is remitted by migrants. This could be 
social  remittances  in  the  sense  of  Levitt  1996,  1998,  2001;  Newland  &  Patrick  2001; 
Gakunzi 2006, including business ideas, patterns of social interaction, and other intangibles 
that modify the behavior of recipient families.     
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we present the data used in this 
study and demonstrate the importance of remittances and migration in Nicaragua. Section 3 
explains the estimation strategy and presents the results. Section 4 discusses some of the   5 
underlying mechanisms through which migration and remittances may affect consumption 
patterns, and, finally, Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. The Importance of Migration and Remittances in Nicaragua 
 
Nicaragua is well suited for the study of the impact of migration and remittances, for two 
reasons. First, it is a poor country where remittances account for an important share of 
household incomes: Remittances into Nicaragua have accounted for at least 7% of GDP 
since  1997,  peaking  at  13.6%  in  1999  due  to  Hurricane  Mitch  (World  Development 
Indicators, The World Bank). The second reason is the availability of panel data. We use 
the three living standard measurement surveys conducted in Nicaragua in 1998, 2001, and 
2005 that have the unusual, but very useful, feature that, to the extent possible, the same 
families have been surveyed in all three years
2. This proves to be a tremendous advantage 
when investigating the dynamic effects of remittances. 
 
2.1 Data description 
 
Our sample contains 2451 households for which we have information from all three waves. 
In part of the analysis, however, we will not make use of the 1998 information, but just 
concentrate on the 3220 households which we can follow from 2001 to 2005, since the 
1998  remittance  data  is  of  lower  quality  than  in  the  2001  and  2005  waves.  In  1998 
households were only asked about the “amount of money received from friends and family 
members  last  month.”  While  these  friends  and  family  members  reside  outside  the 
household, they do not necessarily reside in another country, so the question does not only 
capture  international  remittances.  Also,  households  were  only  asked  about  last  month, 
which may not have been representative for the whole year. In the 2001 and 2005 waves, 
the remittance question was made more precise, by asking about remittances from within 
the country and abroad separately, and by asking about remittances received the last 12 
months instead of just last month. This allows us to calculate the variable “Average annual 
                                                 
2 4080 households were surveyed in the 1998 wave. Of these, 3028 households were re-surveyed in 2001, and 
1143 new households were included in the 2001 wave. In the 2005 wave, there were only 2451 households 
left from the 1998 wave, but 3220 households could be matched between 2001 and 2005.   6 
international remittances received per household member in 2001 ($US/year),” which is 
one of our key explanatory variables. This variable is positive for 16% of the households in 
our sample. Other variables in the 1998 data are used in modeling the migration decision, 
even though the remittances are not, so all three waves of the panel do come into play. 
 
Our second key explanatory  variable  is the  number of  migrants that the household  has 
living abroad in 2001. Table 1 shows that 85.7% of all the households in our sample has no 
migrant living abroad, 8.5% have 1 migrant abroad, 3.0% have 2 migrants abroad, while 
2.7% have 3 or more migrants living abroad. 
 
Table 1: Households in the 2001 survey, by number of migrants abroad 
  Number of migrants living abroad 
  0 migrants  1 migrant  2 migrants  3+ migrants 
No. of households  2570  256  91  82 
% of households  85.7  8.5  3.0  2.7 
   
It is not strictly necessary to have a migrant abroad in order to receive remittances, nor will 
having  a  migrant  abroad  guarantee  the  receipt  of  remittances.  Table  2  shows  that  a 
significant share of households (7.1%) received remittances in 2001 although they didn’t 
have a migrant abroad. This means that they must have received from friends or relatives 
that did not originally belong to this household. About 5.4% of all households did have a 
migrant abroad, but didn’t receive any remittances in 2001, possibly because the migrant 
needed the money more than the household of origin. 
 
Table 2: Households in the 2001 survey, by migrant status and remittance status 
  Did not receive 
remittances in 2001 
Received remittances 
in 2001 
Did not have a migrant abroad in 2001  2,357 (78.6%)  213 (7.1%) 
Did have a migrant abroad in 2001  162 (5.4%)  267 (8.9%) 
 
The fact that all four types of households exist in significant numbers, allows testing the 
impact of having migrants abroad separately from the impact of the receipt of remittances.   7 
 
The key dependent variables in our analysis are consumption per person in each household 
in 2001 and growth in consumption per person between 2001 and 2005. The first is used to 
measure the immediate static impact of remittances and migrants abroad, while the latter is 
used to measure the dynamic (medium run) impacts.  
 
Apart  from  these  key  variables,  we  use  a  number  of  control  variables.  These  include 
location of the household (rural or urban),  the highest education level in the household 
(measured in years), number of household members currently living in the household, a 
dummy indicating if the head of household is a woman, and separate dummies for having a 
migrant in either the US or Costa Rica. These are the main receiving countries of migrants 
from Nicaragua, and they are associated with very different household characteristics, since 
migration to the US is more costly initially and should generate higher income abroad, 
whereas migrants to Costa Rica mainly are poorer agricultural workers.  
 
3. Estimation results 
 
In order to put the main empirical results of this paper into perspective and understand the 
mechanisms driving the results, it is useful to start from a simple, standard model and step 
by step address some of the problems associated with the simple model. 
 
3.1 The simple OLS model in levels 
 
Most empirical papers on the effect of remittances only have cross-section data – typically 
a household survey – available. If you run a simple OLS regression explaining the log level 
of  per  capita  consumption  using  as  explanatory  variables  the  log  level  of  per  capita 
remittances  received,  the  same  variable  squared,  number  of  migrants  abroad, the  same 
variable squared, as well as some control variables, then you find that remittances have a 
positive and highly significant effect on contemporary consumption. In this simple model, 
having up to 6 migrants abroad also appears to be beneficial for the household (see Table 3 
and Figure 3). 
   8 
Table 3: OLS cross section regression analysis for 2001 using log consumption level in 
2001 as the dependent variable 
Explanatory variable  Coefficient  t-value 
Ln(remittances per capita) in 2001  0.0404  7.06 
Ln(remittances per capita)
2 in 2001  ----  ---- 
Number of migrants abroad in 2001  0.0837  2.97 
Number of migrants abroad
2 in 2001  -0.0129  -2.41 
Highest education level in 2001  0.0668  24.24 
Number of household members 2001  -0.1182  -31.33 
Urban dummy 2001  0.3333  14.96 
Female household head dummy 2001  -0.0729  -3.22 
Constant  6.1877  195.84 
No. obs. = 2835  R
2 = 0.4847 
Note: ---- The quadratic term was excluded because of statistical insignificance. 
 
The effect of remittances was  found to be  linear in this  model. However, although the 
coefficient is statistically significant, it is small, indeed much smaller than expected. A 
household that receives $1000 per year in remittances for each household member only has 
a per capita consumption level that is about $150 higher per year than a household that does 
not receive remittances (see Figure 2). This can mean two things: Either remittances crowd 
out other sources of income (own work), so that the net effect is much smaller than the 
amount of remittances received, or remittances are not used for consumption, but rather for 
investments. Andersen, Christensen & Molina (2005) use the Nicaraguan panel data to test 
how remittances received in 1998 affect changes in investment rates between 1998 and 
2001, and find no effect. They also find that remittances received in 1998 have a negative 
effect  on  the  change  in  hours  worked  between  1998  and  2001.  This  suggests  that  the 
dominant explanation for the limited impact of remittances is the crowding out effect.  
   9 























































Per capita remittances received (USD/person/year)
 
 
The effect of having migrants abroad (independently of whether they send remittances or 
not) is non-linear in the simple OLS model. Having one migrant abroad is associated with a 
$39 increase in per capita consumption compared to having no migrant abroad. Additional 
migrants have less impact and from the fourth migrant the effect is negative. The optimal 
number is three migrants, which is associated with a $79 increase in annual consumption 
compared to having no migrant abroad (see Figure 3). 
 






















































Number of migrants abroad
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The joint significance of remittances and number of migrants suggests that not only the 
amount received matters, but also having migrants abroad in itself. The simple OLS model, 
however, may suffer from a serious self-selection bias, as households that have migrants 
abroad on average are richer than households that do not (see Figure 1 above).  
 
3.2. Model in levels, corrected for self-selection bias in the receipt of remittances 
 
The problem of selection bias can be addressed by applying Heckman’s (1979) two-step 
method. To predict the probability of receiving  remittances, we use the  following  four 
variables: the highest education level in the household, the number of migrants abroad, and 
the two dummies for migrants in the US and Costa Rica. All explanatory variables are 
highly significant and have a positive effect on the probability of receiving remittances (see 
Table 4). Having a migrant in the US yields a higher probability of receiving remittances 
than having a migrant in Costa Rica.  
 
Table  4:  Heckman  two-step  cross  section  regression  analysis  for  2001  using  log 
consumption level in 2001 as the dependent variable 
Explanatory variables – step 2  Coefficient  z-value 
     Ln(remittances per capita) in 2001  0.0466  4.04 
     Ln(remittances per capita)
2 in 2001  ----  ---- 
     Number of migrants abroad in 2001  -0.0057  -0.20 
     Number of migrants abroad
2 in 2001  ----  ---- 
     Highest education level in 2001  0.0461  7.80 
      Number of household members 2001  -0.1251  -13.43 
     Urban dummy 2001  0.3569  6.13 
      Female household head dummy 2001  -0.0449  -0.94 
     Constant  6.4328  38.73 
     Lambda  -0.0536  0.77 
Explanatory variables – step 1  Coefficient  z-value 
     Highest education level in 2001  0.0533  6.97 
     Migrant in the US in 2001  1.1262  6.98 
     Migrant in Costa Rica in 2001  0.8933  6.42   11 
     Number of migrants abroad in 2001  0.4281  6.40 
     Constant  -1.7177  -25.90 
No. obs. = 2837  Uncensored obs. = 463 
Note: ---- The quadratic terms were excluded because of statistical insignificance. 
 
Table  4  shows  that  remittances  still  have  a  highly  significant  effect  on  contemporary 
consumption after adjusting for self-selection bias, but having migrants abroad has become 
insignificant.  The  coefficient  on  Lambda  (the  inverse  Mill’s  ratio)  is  insignificant, 
suggesting  that  the  self-selection  bias  is  not  very  large  in  this  model,  and  indeed  the 
coefficient estimate on the remittance variable changes little compared to the simple OLS 
model (Table 3). 
 
3.3. Model in changes, corrected for self-selection bias in the reception of remittances 
 
The  finding  that  remittances  received  increase  contemporary  consumption  is  not  too 
surprising and it is consistent with the literature. However, the real issue whether this more 
than temporary relief, i.e., whether remittances have permanent positive effects by allowing 
households to invest in productive assets (both physical and human).  
 
If remittances have positive dynamic effects, we would expect the consumption levels of 
remittance  receiving  households  to  increase  faster than  the  consumption  levels  of  non-
remittance  receiving  households.  This  is  investigated  in  Table  5  where  the  dependent 
variable is the change in log consumption. The results show that the expected effect is 
absent. Indeed, remittances appear to have a negative effect on the subsequent increase in 
consumption,  although  the  result  is  not  statistically  significant.  Note  that  this  result  is 
corrected for the self-selection bias in the receipt of remittances, and that the selection bias 
is now statistically significant. 
   12 
Table 5: Heckman two-step cross section regression analysis for 2001 using changes in log 
consumption between 2001 and 2005 as the dependent variable 
Explanatory variable – step 2  Coefficient  z-value 
     Ln(remittances per capita) in 2001  -0.0084  -0.63 
     Ln(remittances per capita)
2 in 2001  ----  ---- 
     Number of migrants abroad in 2001  -0.0554  -1.62 
     Number of migrants abroad
2 in 2001  ----  ---- 
     Highest education level in 2001  0.0013  0.19 
      Number of household members 2001  0.0329  2.94 
     Urban dummy 2001  -0.0101  -0.15 
      Female household head dummy 2001  0.0421  0.76 
     Constant  0.1662  0.85 
     Lambda  -0.1534  -1.98 
Explanatory variable – step 1  Coefficient  z-value 
     Highest education level in 2001  0.0510  6.33 
     Migrant in the US in 2001  1.1744  7.19 
     Migrant in Costa Rica in 2001  0.9230  6.52 
     Number of migrants abroad in 2001  0.4088  5.92 
     Constant  -1.7949  -25.62 
No. obs. = 2763  Uncensored obs. = 389 
Note: ---- The quadratic terms were excluded because of statistical insignificance. 
 
3.4. Model in changes, corrected for self-selection bias in the receipt of remittances as well 
as in the migration decision 
 
The selection corrections applied so far are for the endogeneity of receipt of remittances, 
following Acosta (2006). However, there are really two endogenous choices being made. 
There is the decision to send a migrant abroad in the first place. Secondly, there is the 
choice of receiving remittances. The  first choice, that of sending a  migrant, is the one 
depending more directly on the household’s level of income, education, etc, as it is an 
investment  decision.  Receipt  of  remittances  is  likely  more  need  based,  and  involves  a 
comparison of who needs the funds more – the migrant or the family back home. It is   13 
therefore of interest to separate the decisions to send a migrant and to accept remittances, 
and study their separate causes and consequences.  
 
Clearly, while separate, the two decisions are not entirely independent, and this must be 
allowed for in the analysis. To this end, we estimate a bivariate probit model, accounting 
for the correlation between the underlying factors driving the two choices. Formally, let Dm 
be the dummy variable indicating whether or not the household has a migrant abroad, i.e., 
Dm = 1 if there is a migrant, and Dm = 0 if not. Similarly, let Dr be the indicator for receipt 
of remittances. Write Zm and Zr for the explanatory variables relevant for the two decisions. 
We  assume  that  the  underlying  unobserved  variables  determining  the  migration  and 
remittance choices are m and r, respectively, so that either choice is made if the associated 































This specification for Dr in isolation is the same as in the standard (univariate) probit from 
the  first  step  in  Heckman’s  two-step  procedure  used  above.  Thus,  the  underlying 
unobserved factor r driving the choice depends linearly on observed regressors Zr, with 
coefficients  r,  and  ur  is  the  household’s  idiosyncratic  error  independent  of  Zr.  With 
normality of ur, this has, without loss of generality, zero mean and unit standard error. Our 
bivariate probit model adopts an analogous specification for the migration choice, possibly 
with different observed characteristics Zm, and the dependence between the choices given 
regressors is governed by the correlation, , between the error terms. 
 
With  these  specifications,  the  joint  probability  distribution  of  Dm  and  Dr  is  readily 
expressed  in  terms  of  the  standard  bivariate  normal  c.d.f.,  thus  facilitating  maximum 
likelihood estimation. Results of this analysis appear in Table 6.   
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Table 6: Biprobit regression explaining migration and remittance decisions in 2001 
Migration decision  Coefficient  z-value 
     Highest education level in 1998  0.0173  1.76 
      Ln(consumption per capita) 1998  0.2964  5.35 
     Household members 1998  0.0896  7.74 
     Urban dummy 1998  0.2005  2.80 
     Constant  -3.6955  -10.60 
Remittance decision  Coefficient  z-value 
     Highest education level in 2001  0.0186  2.10 
      Ln(consumption per capita) 2001  0.3704  6.12 
     Migrant in the US 2001  0.4348  2.20 
     Migrant in Costa Rica 2001  0.4433  2.33 
      Number of migrants abroad 2001  0.3069  4.17 
     Female headed household 2001  0.1841  2.66 
     Household members 2001  0.0257  1.80 
     Urban dummy 2001  0.2472  3.26 
     Constant  -4.0546  -10.10 
 
 
Whether the household has a migrant abroad in 2001 depends mostly on past actions and 
conditions, so we use explanatory variables from 1998 for the first decision. The results 
show  that  richer,  better  educated,  larger,  urban  households  are  more  likely  to  send  a 
migrant. 
 
Whether  the  household  receives  remittances  in  2001  depends  mostly  on  the  current 
situation, so we use explanatory variables from the same year for this decision. Here we 
include  current  consumption,  since  the  dependent  variable  in  the  second  step  below  is 
consumption growth through 2005. The results show that richer, better educated, female 
headed,  urban  households  with  several  migrants  abroad  are  more  likely  to  receive 
remittances.  
   15 
The  correlation  between  the  migration  and  remittance  accept  decisions  is  positive,  as 
expected, with a point estimate of 0.35, which is significantly different from 0, showing 
that the two decisions are not independent. 
  
While of interest in their own right, the bivariate probit estimates in addition allow a more 
complete selectivity correction of the consumption growth regression. Thus, in the previous 
regressions,  the  dummy  for  having  a  migrant  abroad  has  been  simply  treated  as  an 
exogenous explanatory variable. Clearly, the endogeneity of the migration decision should 
be  accounted  for  in the consumption growth regression. Indeed, the  migration decision 
logically  comes  before  the  remittance  receipt  decision,  is  more  directly  made  by  the 
household, and presents probably a greater endogeneity problem than the remittance receipt 
variable  itself.  The  bivariate  probit  results  can  be  used  to  construct  a  joint  selectivity 
correction for both variables in the consumption growth regression, now treating migration 
and the receipt of remittances in a symmetric fashion.  
 
The idea is to build selectivity correction terms for the consumption growth regression that 
generalize the standard inverse Mill’s ratio terms from the univariate probit in the first step 
of Heckman’s procedure to the case of a bivariate probit in the first step. For robustness 
against possible non-normality, we follow the Newey (1991) approach and the application 
of this in Martins (2001) and adopt a semiparametric approximation to the second step 








) , (     be a k’th order polynomial in v, with 
coefficients  = (0,…,k). The selectivity term is approximated as (Z,), where Z are 
the  first  step  regressors.  The  polynomial  order  k  serves  a  role  similar  to  a  bandwidth 
parameter in kernel estimation, and the procedure yields consistent selectivity corrected 
second step estimation (see Newey (1991)).  
 
In our case, the second step regression may be written 
 
                 r r m m mr r r r m m m Z Z Z Z X c ) , ( ) , (  
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Following Martins (2001), we use k = 2, so the polynomials include terms up to second 
order, and mr is the coefficient on the cross-term in our generalization to the bivariate case. 
Newey (1991) considered the univariate first step case and so had a single polynomial  
and no cross-term in the second step. He also considered semiparametric alternatives to 
probit in the first step, yielding alternative estimates of  for the second step. For simplicity, 
we  stay  with  the  basic  bivariate  probit  estimates  from  above  for  m  and  r,  but  our 
generalized procedure does retain some robustness against departures from joint normality 
through the semiparametric second step.  
 
Newey (1991) considered the case of two distinct subsamples, the selected and the not 
selected subsample, corresponding to a single bivariate endogenous choice, and restricted 
estimation  of  the  second  step  regression  to  the  selected  subsample.  As  a  further 
generalization of the approach, we do not restrict the second step regression to the selected 
sample. As we have data for all four subsamples defined by the endogenous choices of 
whether or not to send a  migrant abroad and whether or not to accept remittances, we 
estimate  the  second  step  regression  separately  for  each  of  the  four  subsamples.  In 
particular, this allows the bivariate selectivity terms (Z,) to take different functional 
forms by subsample. To understand why this is necessary for consistency, it suffices to 
consider the analogous case of the standard Heckman procedure. Here, the correction term 
only takes the well-known inverse Mill’s ratio form  = /  for the selected subsample, 
whereas the correct specification for the not selected subsample is  = (1 - )/. 
    
The results from the second step selection corrected estimation are exhibited in Table 7. 
Since  there  are  many  insignificant  variables,  Stata’s  StepWise  procedure  was  used  to 
systematically remove one by one (starting with the least significant) all the variables that 
were not statistically significant at the 10% level.  
 
The results for the case of both migration and receipt of remittances, Dm = Dr = 1, are 
presented in the first column. Here, the size of remittances is now entirely insignificant, 
suggesting that the amount received does not impact consumption growth. On the other 
hand, the larger the number of migrants abroad, the higher the consumption growth of the   17 
household left behind. This effect is significant, with a t-statistic of 2.69, and the point 
estimate  shows  that  each  additional  migrant  abroad  increases  the  rate  of  consumption 
growth by about 14 percentage points, which is considerable.  
 
Table  7:  Consumption  growth  regressions  with  bivariate  selection  correction,  reduced 
models 
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(-2.56)   18 








No. obs.       217  1738  131  170 
R
2  0.1134  0.2449  0.2167  0.1934 
Notes:  X: variable dropped since constant within group by construction.  
            ----: variable dropped by Stata because of statistical insignificance. 
 
Group 2 consists of households that neither had migrants abroad nor received remittances, 
so  for  this  group  it  is  logically  impossible  to  estimate  the  effect  of  migrants  and 
remittances. For Group 3, households that do not receive remittances despite having at least 
one migrant abroad, we also find that migrants abroad contribute to higher consumption 
growth. Indeed the estimated effect, at 20 percentage points, is  larger than for Group 1 
households  that  do  receive  remittances.  Finally,  for  Group  4,  households  that  receive 
remittances despite not having any migrant abroad, we do not find any significant effect of 
remittances. This is consistent with what we found for Group 1, where remittances were 
insignificant too. In sum, it appears that it is beneficial for households to have migrants 
abroad, but not because of the financial remittances received from them. 
 
It is possible to unite the 4 separate regressions  in one  final  model  by  multiplying the 
selectivity terms with dummies for inclusion in each of the respective four groups. Thus, 
instead of five selectivity correction terms, we have 20, and instead of one constant term, 
we have four (see Table 8 – Column (a)). Submitting this regression to Stata’s Stepwise 
procedure in order to systematically remove the least significant variables until all have p-
values lower than 0.1 yields the final result presented in Column (b) of Table 8. Many of 
the  selection  correction  terms  turn  out  highly  significant,  thus  indicating  significant 
selection bias. 
 
Table  8:  Joint  consumption  growth  regression  with  simultaneous  bivariate  selection 
correction, full model and reduced model 





Explanatory variable – step 2  Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value)   19 
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     Number of migrants abroad
2  -0.0078 
(-0.78) 
---- 




     Number of household members  -0.0039 
(-0.92) 
---- 








     Constant* Dr=1,m=1  0.2769 
(1.14) 
---- 
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     Zrr Dr=1,m=1  0.0469 
(0.39) 
---- 
     (Zrr)
















     (Zmm)
2 Dr=0,m=0  0.2969 
(0.98) 
---- 
     Zrr Dr=0,m=0  -0.0417 
(-0.61) 
---- 
     (Zrr)
2 Dr=0,m=0  0.1010 
(0.57) 
----   20 
    ZmmZrr Dr=0,m=0  0.0878 
(0.45) 
---- 
     Constant* Dr=0,m=1  0.3162 
(0.89) 
---- 




     (Zmm)
2 Dr=0,m=1  0.6444 
(0.94) 
---- 
     Zrr Dr=0,m=1  0.0104 
(0.07) 
---- 
     (Zrr)
2 Dr=0,m=1  0.3159 
(0.82) 
---- 
    ZmmZrr Dr=0,m=1  -0.1668 
(-0.47) 
---- 
     Constant* Dr=1,m=0  0.0875 
(0.22) 
---- 
     Zmm Dr=1,m=0  -0.9793 
(-1.78) 
---- 
     (Zmm)
2 Dr=1,m=0  0.6751 
(1.01) 
---- 
     Zrr Dr=1,m=0  -1.1579 
(-2.46) 
---- 
     (Zrr)








No. obs.       2256  2256 
R
2  0.2170  0.2121 
Note: ----: variable dropped because of statistical insignificance. 
 
The results in the final, joint, reduced consumption growth model (Table 8, Column (b)) 
indicate  a  non-linear  effect  of  remittances  on  consumption  growth  once  the  various 
selection  biases are adequately corrected for. Figure 4a shows the simulated non-linear 
effect, which is positive and increasing for amounts up to about US$ 150 per person per 
year. For amounts larger than that, the effect becomes smaller and smaller. The receipt of 
$150 per person per year is estimated to cause an increase in consumption levels between   21 
2001 and 2005 of about 35% compared to 12% for households that do not receive any 
remittances. The results concerning remittances are not very robust, however. In the full 
model  (Table  8,  Column  (a)),  both  the  linear  and  the  quadratic  term  are  statistically 
insignificant. 
 
In contrast, having a migrant abroad has a very robust and positive effect on consumption 
growth.  Indeed,  having  one  or  more  migrants  abroad  is  found  to  have  a  much  larger 
positive  effect  on  consumption  growth  than  the  receipt  of  remittances  (see  Figure  4b). 
Having one migrant abroad on average increase consumption growth between 2001 and 
2005 to 42%. For two migrants abroad the average increase is 81%. The effect of migrants 
abroad increases exponentially, so a household with 5 migrants abroad would experience 
consumption growth of 274% compared to just 12% for households without any migrant 
abroad. 
 



































































































































The empirical results presented above suggest that the migration strategy is very favorable 
for the Nicaraguan households that apply this strategy, but that the benefits do not primarily   22 
arise from the  monetary remittances received from abroad. Indeed, remittances seem to 
crowd out other sources of income, so that the net effect on consumption is very limited. 
 
So, in what way can a migrant abroad be beneficial to a household in Nicaragua, if it is not 
through  the  money  sent  back?  A  limited  literature  on  social  remittances  suggests  that 
migrants adopt new values, attitudes, and practices at their destination, and that some of 
these values and practices get transmitted to the family at home (Levitt 1996, 1998, 2001; 
Newland & Patrick 2001; Gakunzi 2006). The social remittances transferred to the family 
of origin can be very concrete, directly applicable business ideas, such as a new product or 
service discovered abroad, a more effective design or attractive packaging, or a new way of 
advertising. But social remittances can also be much more subtle. Levitt (1998) notes the 
strong impact of migration on gender identity in the Dominican Republic. Migrant women 
modify  their  ideas  about  women’s  role  in  society  in  response  to  their  more  active 
engagement in the labor market abroad, and transmit these new ideas back to family and 
friends in the Dominican Republic. Non-migrant women then use these social remittances 
to construct new visions of womanhood, creating a marked change in attitudes towards 
male-female relations and the division of labor. Such changes in gender perceptions may 
cause non-migrant women to choose to have fewer children and instead engage in labor 
market activities, both of which would help increase consumption per household member. 
This hypothesis is consistent with the surprisingly dramatic decrease in fertility rates that 
Nicaragua  has  experienced  during  the  last  15  years,  just  when  emigration  boomed 
(Andersen 2007).  
 
The effects of social remittances are not limited to the household of origin, but may spread 
to society at large. A study of the African diaspora in the Netherlands and Portugal find that 
the social remittances transferred to Africa include innovative ideas, valuable transnational 
networks, knowledge, sound political contributions, policy reforms, valuable democratic 
habits  and  attitudes,  appropriate  peace-making  ideas  and  practices,  new  technological 
skills, norms of behavior, work ethics, social values, and cultural influence (Gakunzi 2006).   23 
5. Conclusion 
 
In  this  paper  we  develop  and  apply  a  new  method  for  simultaneously  correcting  the 
consumption growth regression for selectivity biases in both the migration choice and the 
choice to receive remittances. 
  
The empirical results, using a three-wave Nicaraguan household survey spanning 7 years, 
indicate that financial remittances are not nearly as beneficial to the recipients as recent 
research has suggested, and that emigration may not be as damaging as claimed in the brain 
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